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2025 · Regular session · House bill
HB5081
HB5081 creates a written-request process to limit the online exposure and sharing of sensitive personal information about Texas judges, court clerks, judicial employees and their defined immediate families.
Official caption: Relating to the protection of personal identifying information of certain individuals in the judicial system; creating a criminal offense.
Official report lists House author(s): Leach. This does not identify sponsors or amendment drafters.
Bill explanation published · Version and amendment review scope is stated below · Individual amendment records may not be separately annotated.
Bill highlights
Selected points from the published explanation. Follow each point to its source-linked context; conditions and limits may matter.
- HB5081 creates a written-request process to limit the online exposure and sharing of sensitive personal information about Texas judges, court clerks, judicial employees and their defined immediate families.
- Who and what it covers: The judge definition includes specified justices, magistrates, justices of the peace and retired or former judges.
- Protected information includes home addresses; exclusively nonbusiness personal telephone numbers; email addresses; Social Security and driver's-license numbers; bank/card details; vehicle identifiers; a minor child's identity; birth dates; school/day-care and employment locations, schedules and routes; and images revealing those details.
- Requests and removal: Section 92.002 restricts knowing sale, licensing, trading, transfer, purchase or other dissemination after a qualifying written request.
- Exceptions differ by activity: The dissemination rule exempts relevant public-interest news/commentary; information voluntarily published by the person concerned; requested transactions; internal or affiliated business use; health/safety alerts; specified credit-reporting, driver-privacy, financial and health-privacy activities; fraud/security work; insurance; law-enforcement support; telecommunications directory services; property, lien and similar government records; and incidental collection/sales connected to those activities.
- Enforcement: An at-risk individual can seek a court order if a violation makes covered information public.
What does it do?
HB5081 creates a written-request process to limit the online exposure and sharing of sensitive personal information about Texas judges, court clerks, judicial employees and their defined immediate families. It took effect September 1, 2025. It is not a blanket right to erase every public record or news report.
Who and what it covers. The judge definition includes specified justices, magistrates, justices of the peace and retired or former judges. Covered employees work for a state court, court clerk, the Office of Court Administration (OCA) or another state judicial-branch agency. Courts include municipal and justice courts as well as higher courts. Family includes first-degree relatives by blood or marriage, plus foster children, wards, legal dependents and people in the same household.
Protected information includes home addresses; exclusively nonbusiness personal telephone numbers; email addresses; Social Security and driver’s-license numbers; bank/card details; vehicle identifiers; a minor child’s identity; birth dates; school/day-care and employment locations, schedules and routes; and images revealing those details. State-agency employment information is excluded. A property address on a real-estate or mapping website is also excluded if it is not connected to ownership, occupancy or other identifying information.
Requests and removal. Section 92.002 restricts knowing sale, licensing, trading, transfer, purchase or other dissemination after a qualifying written request. Section 92.003 separately restricts public website display after a request by the at-risk individual or OCA on that individual’s behalf. Section 92.004 requires a recipient, including a data broker, to remove identified information by the tenth business day after receipt, keep it off other public or subsidiary websites the recipient controls, identify other instances needing removal, and help the requester locate it on those sites. Section 92.006 also restricts subsequent transfers through any medium, subject to its exceptions.
Exceptions differ by activity. The dissemination rule exempts relevant public-interest news/commentary; information voluntarily published by the person concerned; requested transactions; internal or affiliated business use; health/safety alerts; specified credit-reporting, driver-privacy, financial and health-privacy activities; fraud/security work; insurance; law-enforcement support; telecommunications directory services; property, lien and similar government records; and incidental collection/sales connected to those activities. The website-display rule has its own three exceptions: relevant public-interest speech, voluntary online posting by the person concerned, and information disseminated by government or its employees/agents. The transfer rule incorporates the dissemination exceptions and separately protects relevant public-interest speech, voluntary posting and requested transfers. An exception in one provision should not be assumed to exempt every other activity.
Enforcement. An at-risk individual can seek a court order if a violation makes covered information public. After the plaintiff wins, the court may impose $500 for each day the information remains public after the order—not automatically from the request date. If the defendant is not a state agency, the court may also award exemplary damages, court costs and reasonable attorney fees.
The law separately criminalizes intentional, nonconsensual posting with intent to cause or threaten harm or harassment when harm or harassment is a probable consequence. It also creates a failure-to-remove offense for a person other than a data broker who fails to remove information identified in a Section 92.003 request within 10 business days. Offenses are Class B misdemeanors, increased to Class A if the offense results in bodily injury to the at-risk person or an immediate family member. The ordinary individual maximums are $2,000 and/or 180 days in jail for Class B, and $4,000 and/or one year for Class A.
Timing and administration. The general rule concerns information posted on or after September 1, 2025, but Sections 92.003 and 92.004 also reach older posts still available on or after that date. The criminal provision applies only when every element occurs on or after the effective date. OCA’s judge-request process is mandatory only if specifically funded; otherwise OCA may use other available appropriations. A statewide automated system is optional. This review does not establish that a particular appropriation was made or a system is operating.
Later-law distinction. HB5081 did not itself expressly add Texas-resident federal judges. Second-special-session HB16, Section 15.06, added that category effective December 4, 2025. The current code reflects that later change.
Sources: HB5081 final law, Sections 1–5; official history; judge definition; family relationships; misdemeanor penalty ranges; HB16, Section 15.06.
What changed along the way?
What changed before passage. All five text versions, the indexed House amendment and the Senate amendment packet were checked against the final law. The House committee substitute narrowed the OCA-assisted process from all at-risk individuals to judges and added the funding condition, optional automation and explicit transition rules.
Jeff Leach’s adopted House amendment on May 13 added the unlinked real-estate/mapping-address exclusion, limited the then-proposed removal duty to data brokers, added a separate 48-hour failure-to-remove offense for other people, and extended the display provision to older information still online. The address exclusion, separate non-broker offense and older-post display rule survived. The 48-hour deadline and broker-only removal duty did not survive in that form.
The Senate committee substitute, adopted as the Senate substitute on May 26, broadened the dissemination restriction beyond data brokers but required a written request and added the detailed exceptions. It restored the removal duty for people generally, set the final 10-business-day deadlines, limited protected phone numbers to exclusively nonbusiness use, clarified clerk/person definitions and removed the proposed presumption of harmful intent based on nonremoval or reposting. It also removed a designee’s separate authority to sue. The Senate substitute’s operative text matches the enrolled law. The House concurred May 28; the governor signed June 20.
The amendment index lists only the House amendment; the separate Senate packet contains the adopted substitute. The packet’s older engrossed body is not the enacted text. Its scanned substitute and accompanying fiscal/impact documents were read separately.
Related code changes. HB5081 refers to the 2023 data-broker chapter and expressly calls for harmonization with the code-correction act. HB1620, Section 22.001(3), renumbered that chapter from 509 to 510. Separate SB2121 removed the definition’s principal-revenue requirement effective September 1, 2025. Those changes are not HB5081 amendments. HB5081 also has its own exclusions from “data broker,” including specified news, directory, internal-business, alert, credit-reporting, financial and health entities; that definition matters particularly to the separate non-broker offense.
Sources: all text versions and fiscal/impact documents; amendment index; House amendment H21; Senate packet, substitute on PDF pages 11–22; HB1620 renumbering; SB2121 definition change.
For the full amendment record, open the official amendment index.
Official bill versions
Compare the published text versions in the official text index. A change is not attributed to a specific amendment here without a verified record.
Who could benefit—and who could bear the costs?
Potential benefits. Covered judicial workers and families gain a structured way to request removal and restrict dissemination, plus civil remedies and criminal protections. That may reduce exposure of home, family and financial details, but the law does not guarantee that information disappears from every source or that harm is prevented.
Who bears obligations. Website operators, data businesses and other recipients must assess qualifying requests, distinguish the different exceptions, search sites they control and meet removal duties. Litigation, compliance and potential penalties can impose costs. Relevant public-interest reporting and specified ordinary data uses retain exceptions; this is not a general prohibition on reporting about judges.
Public cost estimate. The May 27, 2025 final fiscal note says the fiscal implications cannot be determined. OCA estimated $200,000–$1 million to implement a system, depending on complexity and features. The note does not specify an annual or multiyear period for that range, and it is an estimate—not an appropriation or a per-person cost. The note anticipates no significant local-government fiscal impact and assumes no significant effect on state correctional populations/resources. Earlier fiscal notes give the same range; all three indexed criminal-justice statements anticipate no significant state correctional effect.
Review boundary. This explanation checks the enacted provisions, prior-version changes, all indexed amendment text, the adopted Senate substitute, fiscal evidence and the referenced definitions/renumbering. It distinguishes the later HB16 expansion. It does not measure actual removals, adjudicate a particular exception, confirm a funded/operating OCA system, or predict court outcomes.
Sources: final fiscal note, May 27, 2025; engrossed criminal-justice impact statement; final duties, remedies and funding condition.
Official sources
- Bill history and latest recorded action
- Bill versions, analyses and fiscal notes
- Action history and votes
- Amendment index
Catalog report retrieved 2026-10-25. Check the official record for corrections or later changes.