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2025 · Regular session · Senate bill
SB827
SB827 expands and reorganizes hand-count checks of electronically counted ballots, adds online publication of results, and coordinates statewide risk-limiting audits.
Official caption: Relating to the audit of an election using an electronic voting system.
Official report lists Senate author(s): Parker. This does not identify sponsors or amendment drafters.
Bill explanation published · Version and amendment review scope is stated below · Individual amendment records may not be separately annotated.
Bill highlights
Selected points from the published explanation. Follow each point to its source-linked context; conditions and limits may matter.
- SB827 expands and reorganizes hand-count checks of electronically counted ballots, adds online publication of results, and coordinates statewide risk-limiting audits.
- The ordinary hand-count sample now separately covers at least 1% of election-day polling locations and 1% of early-voting locations, or three of each, whichever is greater, where electronic voting systems were used.
- Normally, the count begins within 72 hours after polls close and finishes by day 21 after election day.
- The early voting ballot board performs the count under the records custodian’s direction; unavailable members can be replaced through existing appointment procedures.
- Risk-limiting audits are statistical checks using paper records.
What does it do?
SB827 expands and reorganizes hand-count checks of electronically counted ballots, adds online publication of results, and coordinates statewide risk-limiting audits. It was signed June 20, 2025, and took effect September 1, 2025. It does not require a full hand recount of every ballot. Final act; History.
The ordinary hand-count sample now separately covers at least 1% of election-day polling locations and 1% of early-voting locations, or three of each, whichever is greater, where electronic voting systems were used. Mail ballots counted automatically get their own sample: at least 1% of precincts with such mail ballots, or three precincts, whichever is greater. The default is random selection and all races on the sampled ballots. In state-and-county general elections, primaries and the specified statewide-measure elections, the secretary of state instead selects the locations/precincts and up to three offices and three propositions, with notice no earlier than the day after election day. The custodian may add locations or precincts under state procedures. Section 127.201(a), (b) and (b-3).
Normally, the count begins within 72 hours after polls close and finishes by day 21 after election day. When a statewide risk-limiting audit is performed, the hand count instead begins no later than the first business day after the state certifies that audit’s completion, and finishes by day 30 after election day or the state-set deadline, whichever is later. These are different procedures with different timing rules. The existing exclusion for direct-recording electronic voting machines remains in the hand-count section. Hand-count deadlines and exception.
The early voting ballot board performs the count under the records custodian’s direction; unavailable members can be replaced through existing appointment procedures. The custodian posts the count’s time and place in the office. People entitled to appoint poll watchers may attend and have an eligible, properly appointed watcher present; the watcher submits certificates to the board’s presiding judge. Within three days after completion, results must go to the secretary of state and appear on the county website where election returns/results are posted. Staffing, observation and disclosure; Ballot-board appointment rules; Watcher eligibility and training.
Risk-limiting audits are statistical checks using paper records. SB827 lets the secretary of state set start and completion dates and select one or more statewide races or measures. All counties holding an election subject to that audit law must participate, regardless of how they count ballots. Existing applicability still matters: the election must occur after August 31, 2026, include a statewide race or measure and use an auditable voting system. That system has a voter-readable paper record and the statutory network-connection restrictions. SB827 does not move this existing 2026 trigger back to 2025. Section 2; Audit applicability; Auditable-system definition; Statistical sampling rules.
What changed along the way?
The introduced bill only renamed the existing partial-count section “Hand Count Election Audit.” The Senate committee substitute added the substantive sampling, staffing, watcher, deadline and publication changes and the statewide risk-limiting-audit changes. The official index reports no floor amendments. Comparison of all five versions shows the substitute, engrossed, House committee and enrolled operative provisions match.
Compared with prior law, the hand-count sample is no longer expressed only in election precincts; election-day locations, early-voting locations and automatically counted mail ballots are addressed separately. The risk-limiting audit no longer has to start within 24 hours after all ballots are counted or finish at least 24 hours before the canvass; the secretary of state sets its dates. Final changes.
For the full amendment record, open the official amendment index.
Official bill versions
Compare the published text versions in the official text index. A change is not attributed to a specific amendment here without a verified record.
Who could benefit—and who could bear the costs?
Voters and election participants gain published hand-count results and a broader, more structured checking process. Election offices and ballot-board members may have more counting, coordination and reporting work. Poll-watcher participation remains governed by eligibility and appointment rules; this is not unrestricted public access to ballots. Neither the act nor its fiscal note proves fraud occurred or guarantees an audit will find a problem. Enacted requirements.
The March 26 substitute fiscal note anticipated no significant state cost and assumed existing resources could cover state work, but said local governments could incur costs from expanded hand counts and risk-limiting audits. It gives no dollar estimate. The March 19 introduced note predicted no state or local impact for the much narrower heading-only proposal; that is not the fiscal assessment of the final expanded law.
Official sources
- Bill history and latest recorded action
- Bill versions, analyses and fiscal notes
- Action history and votes
- Amendment index
Catalog report retrieved 2026-10-25. Check the official record for corrections or later changes.