← Back to bills and search results
2025 · Regular session · Senate bill
SB926
SB926 allows covered health plans to offer cost-sharing incentives for using particular providers, but requires those steering and network-tier decisions to primarily benefit the patient or policyholder.
Official caption: Relating to certain practices of health benefit plan issuers to encourage the use of certain physicians and health care providers and rank physicians.
Official report lists Senate author(s): Hancock. This does not identify sponsors or amendment drafters.
Bill explanation published · Version and amendment review scope is stated below · Individual amendment records may not be separately annotated.
Bill highlights
Selected points from the published explanation. Follow each point to its source-linked context; conditions and limits may matter.
- SB926 allows covered health plans to offer cost-sharing incentives for using particular providers, but requires those steering and network-tier decisions to primarily benefit the patient or policyholder.
- These incentives also cannot make out-of-network emergency cost sharing higher than the corresponding in-network amount.
- For covered physician rankings and performance tiers, issuers must disclose the ranking/classification and methodology at least 45 days before release, identify the products/networks using it, and provide an easy process to flag discrepancies before release and objectively verifiable false information afterward.
- Ranking standards must come from an organization designated by the insurance commissioner: a qualifying national medical specialty society or a bona fide organization unbiased toward providers and insurers.
What does it do?
SB926 allows covered health plans to offer cost-sharing incentives for using particular providers, but requires those steering and network-tier decisions to primarily benefit the patient or policyholder. For HMOs and insurers under the preferred/exclusive-provider chapter, that is a fiduciary duty—a legal duty to act for the specified beneficiary’s primary benefit. Incentives cannot be based solely on cost or solely on the provider’s ownership/control relationship with the insurer. They cannot be used to limit medically necessary care, encourage lower-quality necessary care or violate law. Plans must use objective, verifiable, accurate information and reasonable safeguards against materially lower-quality favored providers or materially false statements about quality/cost. Sections 1–3.
These incentives also cannot make out-of-network emergency cost sharing higher than the corresponding in-network amount. The new steering sections exclude limited-scope vision plans, not comprehensive medical plans merely because they cover eye care. Scope differs by provision: the preferred/exclusive-provider chapter excludes Medicaid managed care, CHIP and dental-care benefits; the separate physician-ranking chapter excludes specified Medicaid/children’s programs and Medicare supplement plans. Do not assume every health arrangement is covered by every rule. New subsections (e)–(f); Vision-plan definition; PPO/EPO scope; Dental exception; Ranking exceptions.
For covered physician rankings and performance tiers, issuers must disclose the ranking/classification and methodology at least 45 days before release, identify the products/networks using it, and provide an easy process to flag discrepancies before release and objectively verifiable false information afterward. Sufficient evidence of a verifiable discrepancy, false information or chapter violation must be remedied by the later of release or 30 days after receipt—not necessarily before publication. This replaces the old detailed reconsideration protections, including a requested telephone/in-person proceeding, representative participation and a reasoned written outcome before dissemination. The exception for an ordinary provider list that does not reflect ratings or tiers remains. Section 4; Previous process and retained list exception.
Ranking standards must come from an organization designated by the insurance commissioner: a qualifying national medical specialty society or a bona fide organization unbiased toward providers and insurers. Standards must emphasize quality, have transparent methods, use risk adjustment when based on clinical outcomes, and support error reporting/correction. The act specifies acceptable evidence/consensus sources and defines the specialty societies, including representation in the American Medical Association’s house of delegates. If the commissioner finds a pattern of the specified discrepancies, falsehoods or violations, the issuer must be barred from using a ranking/classification system for at least 12 consecutive months. Existing sanctions remain. Signed June 20, 2025, the law took effect September 1, 2025. Sections 5–7; Existing enforcement; History.
What changed along the way?
The introduced bill already proposed a primary-benefit duty and a rewritten ranking process. The Senate substitute added specific steering violations, strengthened disclosure/correction details, revised eligible standards organizations and added the minimum 12-month ranking ban for a pattern of violations. The sole floor amendment, Hancock’s adopted Senate amendment, added the cost-only prohibition, emergency cost-sharing ceiling and vision-plan exclusion to both steering sections. Engrossed, House-report and final operative text then match. Disposition; All versions.
For the full amendment record, open the official amendment index.
Official bill versions
Compare the published text versions in the official text index. A change is not attributed to a specific amendment here without a verified record.
Who could benefit—and who could bear the costs?
Patients gain statutory safeguards against conflicted or poorly supported steering, while plans retain the ability to encourage selected providers. Physicians gain explicit insurer correction duties and a strong sanction for repeated problems, but lose the former detailed hearing-style reconsideration process. A late-supported error may remain public until the later correction deadline. Implementation requires reliable quality/cost data and complaint handling; the act does not guarantee equal provider prices, lower premiums or better outcomes. Final duties and process.
The March 30 introduced, April 12 substitute and April 22 engrossed fiscal notes anticipate no significant state or local fiscal impact and assume costs can be absorbed with existing resources. They do not estimate private compliance costs, premium changes or patient savings.
Official sources
- Bill history and latest recorded action
- Bill versions, analyses and fiscal notes
- Action history and votes
- Amendment index
Catalog report retrieved 2026-10-25. Check the official record for corrections or later changes.